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George Stigler's work on the theory of regulation is one of those
rare contributions--rare for the rest of us, though not for him-—which
force a fundamental change in the way important problems are analyzed.
Stigler's influence will be clear in this paper. There is perhaps
no more telling evidence of this influence than that its basic motivation
was my dissatisfaction with some of Stigler's conclusions. (it was a
dissatisfaction that Stigler shared, since I can report that we simul-
taneously reached one of the conclusions elaborated here--that regulatory
agencies will not exclusively serve a single economic interest.) My
intellectual debt to Stigler is so great that this paper emerges as an
extension and generalization of his pioneering work.
What Stigler accomplished in his Theory of Economic Regulation
was to crystallize a revisionism in the economic analysis of regulation
that he had helped launch in his and Claire Friedland's work on electric
utilities.1 The revisionism had its genesis in a growing disenchantment
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including review by the Bureau's Board of Directors. The views expressed
herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the National Bureau of Economic Research.
1G. J. Stigler, The Theory of EconomicRegulation, 2 Bell J.
of Econ. and Mgt. Science 3 (1971) and G. J. Stigler and C. Friedland,
What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J. of Law and
Econ. 1 (1962).2
with the usefulness of the traditional role of regulation in economic analy-
sis as a deus ex machina which eliminated one or another unfortunate alloca-
tive consequence of market failure. The creeping recognition that regulation
seemed seldom to actually work this way, and that it may have even engendered
more resource misallocation than it cured, forced attention to the influence
which the regulatory powers of the state could have on the distribution of
wealth as well as on allocative efficiency. Since the political process
does not usually provide the dichotomous treatment of resource allocation
and wealth diribution so beloved by welfare economists, it as an easy
step to seek explanation for the failure of the traditional analysis to
predict the allocative effects of regulation in the dominance of political
pressure for redistribution on the regulatory process. This focus on
regulation as a powerful engine for redistribution shows clearly in such
works as Jordan's Producer Protection and PosnerTs Taxation by Regulation.2
The common role of regulation in this literature is as a fulcrum upon
which contending interests seek to exercise leverage in their pursuit of
wealth. A coon, though not universal,3 conclusiop has become that, as
between the two main countending interests in regulatory processes, the pro-
ducer interesb tends to prevnil over the consumer interest.
In one sense, Stigler's work provides a theoretical foundation for
this "producer protection" view. However, its scope is much more general.
It is ultimately a theory of the optimum size of effective political
2
W. A. Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the
Effects of Government Regulation, 15 J. Law and Econ. 151 (1972) and
R. A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 Bell J. of Econ. and Mgi. Science
22(1971).
Posner, op. cit., is an important exception.3
coalitionsset within the framework of a general model of the political
process. Stigler seems to have realized that the earlier "consu.mer pro-
tection" model comes perilously close to treating regulation as a free
good. In that model the existence of market failure is sufficient to
generate a demand for regulation, though there is no mention of the
mechanism that makes that demand effective. Then, in a crude reversal
of Say's Iw, the demand is supplied costlessly by the political process.
Since the good, regulation, is not in fact free and demand for it is not automa-
tically synthesized, Stigler sees the task of a positive economics of
regulation as specifying the arguments underlying the supply and demand
for regulation.
The way he does this abstracts almost completely from pure alloca-
tion questions. The essential commodity being transacted in the political
market is a transfer of wealth, with constituents on the demand side and
their politicalreprsentatives on the supply side. Viewed in this way,
the market here, as elsewhere, will distribute more of the good to those
whose effective demand is highest. For Stigler, the question of which
group will lave the highest effective demand translates very quickly
into a question of numbers. In this view, "producer protection" rep-
resents the dominance of a small group with a large per capita stake
over the large group (consumers) with more diffused interests. The
central question for the theory then becotries to explain this regularity
of small group dominance in the regulatory process (and indeed the politi-
cal process generally). The way the question is posed already foreshadows
one of the results of the theory. For in Stigler's model, unlike most
market models, there are many bidders, but only one is successful. There
is essentially a political auction in which the high bidder receives theJ4
rightto taxthewealth of everyone else, and the theory seeks to discover
why the successful bidder is a numerically compact group. The answer lies
essentially in the relationship of group size to the costs of using the
political process.
To summarize the argument briefly, the size of the dominant group
is limited in the first instance by the absence of something like ordinary-
market-ol1ar voting in politics. Voting is infrequent and concerned with
a package of issues. In the case of a particular issue, the voter must
spend resources to inform himself about its implications for his wealth
aniwhichpolitician is likely to stand on which side of the issue. That
information cost will have to offset prospective gains, and a voter with
a small per capita stake will not, therefore, incur it. In consequence the
numerically large, diffuse interest group is unlikely to be an effective
bidder, and a policy inimical to the interest of a numerical majority
will not be automatically rejected. A second major limit on effective
group size arises from costs of organization. It is not enough for the
successful group to recognize its interests; it must organize to translate
this interest into support for the politician who will implement it.
This mns not only mobilizing its own vote, but contributing resources
to the support of the appropriate political party or policy: to finance
campaigns, to persuade other voters to support or at least not oppose
the policy or candidate, perhaps occasionally to bribe those in office.
While there may be some economies of scale in this organization of
support and neutralization d opposition, these must be limited. The
larger the group that seeks the transfer, the narrower the base of the
opposition and the greater are the per capita stakes that determine the
strength of opposition, so lobbying and campaigning costs will rise faster5
than group size. The cost of overcoming "free riders" will also rise
faster than group size. This diseconomy of scale in providing resources
then acts as another limit to the size of the group that will ultimately
dominate the political process.
In suis, Stigler is asserting a law of diminishing returns to
group size in politics: Beyond some point it becomes counterproductive
to dilute the per capita transfer. Since the total transfer is endogenous,
there is a corollary thatdirninishing returns apply to the transfer as well,
due both to the opposition provoked by the transfer and to the demand this
opposition exerts on resources to quiet it.
Stigler does not himself rormalize this model, and my first task
will be to do just this. My simplified formal version of his model pro-
duces a result to which Stigler gave only passing recognition, namely
that the costs of using the political process limit not only the size of
the dominant group but also their gains. This is at one level, a detail,
which is the way Stigler treated it, but a detail with some important
implications--for entry into regulation, and for the price-output structure
that emerges from regulation. The main task of the paper is to derive
these implications from a generalization of Stigler's model.
A Stiglerian Model of Regulation
I begin with the presumption that what is basically at stake in
regulatory processes is a transfer of wealth. The transfer, as Stigler
points out, will rarely be in cash, but rather in the form of a regulated
pricej entry restricticn, etc. I shall ignore that detail here, and the
resulting model applies to any political wealth redistribution. A parti-
cularizationto price and entry regulation comes later. I treat the relevant6
political process as if control of the relevant taxing power rests on direct
voting, though this too is meant only for simplification. Though appoint-
ment of a regulatory body may lie effectively with a legislature, a com-
mittee thereof, or an executive, the electorate's receptivity to these
intermediaries ought to be affected by the performance of their appointees.
With Stigler, I assume that beneficiaries pay with both votes and dollars.
However, again as a simplifiation, I assume that the productivity of the
dollars to a politician lies in mitigation of opposition. A more general
model might make "dollars" (broadly defined to include, for example, em-
ployment of former regulators) a source of direct as well as indirect
utility to the regulator.In this model, though, direct political support--
"votes"--is the object sought directly by the regulator.More particularly
he seeks to maximize net votes or a majority in his favor. There is no
presumption that the marginal utility of a majority vanishes at one.
Greater majorities are assumed to imply greater security of tenure, more
logrolling possibilities, greater deference from legislative budget com-
mittees, etc. The crucial decision that the regulator (or would-be regu-
lator) must make in this model is the numerical size of the group he (pro-
mises) favors, and thus implicitly the size of the group he taxes. At
this stage,I retain Stigler1s presumption that the agency confers benefits
on a single victorious group, and the essential purpose of the model is
to elaborate the limits on this group's size.
To put this formally, the regulator wants to maximize a majority
M, generated by
(1) M =n 1' -(N-n)
.h, .7
where
n =numberof potential voters in the beneficiary group
C =(net)probability that a beneficiary will grant support
Ntotal number of potential voters
h =(net)probability that he who is taxed (every non-n) opposes.
Note that, because both gainers and losers face transaction and
infon'riation costs, f and h are not either zero or unity, but depend
on the amountofthe group memberts gain or loss. There are similar costs
facing the regulator, so he cannot exclude nonsupporting beneficiaries.
At this stage, I assume that gains and losses are equal per capita within
groups. This nondiscrimination assumption serves both to simplify the
problem and to force Stigler's result of a single politically dominant
economic interest, but the assumption is subseently dropped. I ajso
assume that ignorance does not lead to perverse or biased voting. If a
beneficiary, for example, does not know enough to vote for his benefactor,
his voting decision is not biased for or against the benefactor. Either he
does not vote, or he decides how to vote by tossing a fair coin. In either
case, the f in (1) will be zero, and M will be the (same) difference
between votes for and votes against. With nonparticipation by the ignorant
f (or h) is simplytheprobability that a beneficiary (or loser) votes,
while with random voting by the ignorant f is the difference between the
probability of a favorable and unfavorable vote by the beneficiary.
The probability of support may now be specified as
(2) ff(g)8
where,g is the per capita net benefit, and is
() g=T-_K- C(n)
with
T =totaldollar amount transferred to the beneficiary group
K =dollarsspent by beneficiaries in campaign funds, lobbying,
etc., to mitigate opposition
C(n) =costof organizing both direct support of beneficiaries and
effortsto mitigate opposition. This organization cost in-
creases with n, but we place no restrictions on the shape
of the rnarnal cost curve.
it is assumed that (2) holds for any subset of the electorate, in the sense
that any coalition of size n faces the same costs of organization and
has members with the same responsiveness to benefits. Thus, the number
of votes in support depends on n in two offsetting ways: a larger n
provides a brder base for support, but dilutes the net gain per member
and so the probability of a member's support.
As a further simplification I assume that the regulator chooses
K as well as T. The process could be modeled with the benefitted group
itself determining the appropriate K, but in doing so it would be moti-
vated by the same forces affecting a regulator who would ask K as a price
for conferring the benefit. Thus, Itreatitas a detailwhether the
beneficiaries "bid" a K and "ask" a T, or whether the regulator asks
a K and bids a T.
The transfer is assumed generated by a tax at the ra t on the
wealth (B) of each memberoutside the benefitted group, so
(5) T=t.B(N-n),ort =B(Nn)9
For application to problems of regulation, B can be thought of as a
typical consumer's surplus and t a regulated price if producers are
beneficiaries, or B might be a producer's surplus and t the difference
between the surplus maximizing price and the regulated price where consumers
are beneficiaries. At this level of generality, though, I simply treat B
as a negative function of Opposition is assumed generated by the tax rate
and mitigated by voter education expenditures per capita (z), so
(6) h =h(t,z)
(7) z=K/(N-n)
In keeping with Stigler's model, I assume that, in the relevant range,




(unless specified otheise subscripts wiltdenote partial, or whereappropriate,
otalderivativesfromhereon) Acomplemeitaryassumptjon is madefor z:
(9) h <0, h >0
z zz
(opposition is measured in positive units), and there are assumed to be
increasing political costs to taxation:
treatment islessinnocent than itappears.It implicibty rules.
ut a "pure"transfer--i.e.,one with no allocative effects. There may be forms ofwealth whose supply is totally inelastic with respect to taxes,but, as a
general matter, these cannot be preswned to suffice the demands of the political
process--or even yield costless taxes, once taxadministrationand evasion costs
are allowed for. The general proposition that every tax affects the wealth base
being taxed has important implications for the evaluation of the wholerange of




In this characterization of the political process, then, office
holders or candidates to replace them must pick the size (n) of the
group they will benefit, the amount (K) they will ask that group to
spend for mitigating opposition and the amount (T) they will transfer
to the beneficiary group. The necessary conditions for these choices
to yield the naximu majority, the presumed goal for the office seeker,
are









m =C,the marginal cost of group organization.








Thus, if there are constant or increasing organization costs (a -m< 0),
the bracketed term is less than one. We are unprepared yet to say much
more than that political wealth maximizationdistributes benefits to a frac-
tion of the electorate, and since we have ruled out net gains to regula-
tion, no other result would make sense.
Before some forces affecting the size of this ratio are elaborated.
it is worth dwelling on (ii) for a moment. This condition--essentially
that the marginal political return from a transfer must eqia1 the marginal
political cost of the associated tax--has an important subsidiary implica-
tion. Since both fg and ht are positive, an interior maximum can occur
only if the term (B +tBt)is also positive. This term is the marginal
product of t in raising revenue from a member of the losing group.That
it must be positive implies that these losers must be taxed less than the
interests of the winners would dictate (a revenue maximizing tax--i.e.,
B +tBt
=0).
This result is portrayed in Figure 1. The function R(t) is
(ht/fg) With diminishing returns in g and increasing costs in t,
is positive and increasing in the relevant range. The marginal revenue
from t, (B +tB),
is decreasing in t, and the revenue maximizing tax is
twhere this marginal revenue is zero. However, with R(t) positive at
t > 0 tcannot be a political equilibrium. The equilibrium, from
(ii), must occur at something like ta <tm
Thus we have an important first principle of regulation: even 1±
a single economic interest gets all the benefits of regulation, these must
be less than a perfect broker for the group would obtain. The best or-
ganized cartel will yield less to the membership if the government organizes
it than if it were (could be) organized privately. This principle is inde-
pendent of organization or campaigning costs, but rests on the heed the12
political process must pay to marginal oppositi. (Condition (11) holds
even if K and C are assumed zero.) It suggests that what the 'capture"
literature treats as an ad hoc detail--that "the political process automa-
tically admits powerful outsiders to the industry's councils"5--is in fact
integral to regulatory processes. The principle also suggests that failure
of regulation to maximize cartel profits need not, as Posner has suggested,
arise as an efficient substitute for other forms oftaxation Even if
more efficient substitutes exist and are used, a rational regulator will
still tax cartel profits to secure his own position.
This logic may be pushed a step further. It will pay the rational
regulator to exploitdifferences within the group that, taken as a whole,
either wins or loses. The ability to do this may be constrained by"due
process" considerations, but not typically to the point that a uniformtax
must be levied or gain transferred to each member of a group. Therefore,
the regulator's choice problem is not limited to selecting the appropriate
size of an interest group to benefit or tax; it includes selection of an
appropriate structure of benefits and costs. Once we dropthe simplifica-
tion of uniform taxes (prices), the identification of regulation with any
single economic interest can no longer be maintained as a general proposi-
tion.
To see this, consider the following restricted problems The regu-
lator has decided on the total wealth that must be transferred to one











economic interest (say producers) fron another, so that both T and n
are data. However, he desires minimization of opposition (0) from con-
sumers by exploiting differences among them in per capita wealth or the
responsiveness of wealth to taxes (i.e., differences in the height and
elasticity of their demands) or in their voting sensitivity to taxes.
Assume that the (N -n)consumers can be separated into 2 groups of





To simplify still further, treat z as fixed and equal for both groups.









wherethe term in parentheses is the constraint that the sum of' sub group
taxes is fixed, and setting the first partials with respect to t1, t2
and 7. equal to zero. The resulting expression for the opposition mini-
mizing t1 is (primes denote derivatives)
TB' h'
(16) =: : B,lpll
1kh)2 P2B2
The denominator is negative, but only the last two terms in the numerator
are negative. This means that a netive t1 cannot be ruled out. Thus
if one group of consumers has sufficiently large per capita demand (B2),
sufficiently low demand elasticity (Bk) and tax responsiveness (h)
relative to the other group, the latter may become part of the winning15
group (get a subsidized price). On a similar argurnent, some producers
may be taxed even if most are benefitted. The regulator!s constituency
thus cannot in general be limited to one economic interest.
The structure of (16) shows that t1 is affected not only by some
obvious characteristics of that group (its wealth and voting response to
t1) but also by characteristics of the other group. I shall return to this
subsequently, for (16) hints at some important implications for the structure
of prices emerging fromigulation--e.g., that this will be the resultant
of forces pushing both for and against profit-maximizing price discrimination.
I want nowtoreturn to (1O)-(13) and discuss some forces affect-
ing the size of the winning group. The Stigler model leads, after all, to
more than the near truism that n/N is less than one; it more nearly
asserts that the ratio is close to zero. So let us examine the effect of
three variables whose importance the Stigler model asserts--support, opposi-
tion and organization costs.
In general, if x represents a variable affecting choice of n
(and T and K), we want to determine the vector of total derivatives:




[Mj] =matrixof cross partial derivatives, i, j =n,T, K
[Ma] =vectorof the cross-partials of w.r.t. x.
I now treat three simple cases:
1. A parametric shift in the support function, f, (which leaves





and from (ii) and the second order condition for a maximum M (that[M1]
be negative definite), we obtain the following signconditions
(19) sign dn/df =signC
where
=cofactorof
Since > 0 by a.second-order condition for a maximum, dn/df > 0--
i.e., anincreasein the probability of support for a given g increases
the size of the winning group. Or, as Stigler iight wish to put it, the dif-
ficulty of translating the transfer into votes leads the regulator to con-
centrate benefits. For the other variables we have
(20) sign dT/df =signCflT
and
(21.) sign dK/df =signC
which are uncertain and negative resctive1y. The underlying reasons
may be seen by writing out the co-factors
S
(22) CnT = - MTM1]17
p
(23) CK ={MTflMTK -MKMTT]
MTK> 0, because an increase in K reduces opposition and makesanincrease
in T more attractive. M
K< 0, because an increase in K also dilutes n
the net in, and makes concentration of the transferon a smaller group
more attractive. MTT, M are both negative, becise ofdiminishing
returns. This leaves MT, whose sign is ambiguous:an inrease in n
dilutes the gain to the winners, which would induce an increase in T.
But the increae in n also concentrates the opposition, and this pushes
for a reduction in T. The only restriction that can be imposed (from the
second-order conditions) is (MT +M)
< 0, which is enough to imply
C < 0 and dK/df < 0, but is insufficient to predict the sign of C
nK nT
If buyingoffa more concentrated opposition is sufficiently important to
render Tn < othendT/df < 0.
2. A parametric shift in the opposition function, h. This yields
precisely the same result as a shift in support (the vector of the relevant
cross-partials is the same as t1 right-hand side of (19)), and this sym-
metry between the effects of support and opposition is perhaps one of the
chief insights of Stiglerts model. If a more effective political support
technology (a rise in f) induces a more numerous winning group, a more
effective opposition technology must lead the regulator to permit a larger
group to escape taxation as well. Some losers will then be made winners
when there is a rise in opposition. This is bett.er stated in the reverse.
The difficulty of translating a tax into political opposition (a low h)
induces the regulator to tax the many and thus to concentrate his favor on
a few. Hence the filtering of information through the noise of a political18
process that forces consideration of many programs simultaneously acts
unambiguously, as Stigler intuited, to restrict the size of the
winning group. This filtering must be done by both winners and losers,
and this makes it simultaneously unattractive to spread the benefits
and attractive to spread the losses over large numbers.
3. A parametric shift in the cost of organizing a group for
political support. Stigler argues that the cost of organizing support
(e.g., the cost of overcoming the "free rider" problem) also restricts n.
However, on closer inspection, this is not obvious. Consider a rise in the





This will be ambiguous for reasons apart from ambiguityaboitCT. Stigler's
argument focuses essentially on M, which is indeed negative and induces
a smaller n. However, because of diminishing returns to per capita gains,
a rise in C will lead to an offsetting decrease in K (MKC< 0). On
balance,this fall in K requires a rise in n (CflK < 0). That is, if
K is reduced, restoring optimum effectiveness of lobbying and education
efforts requires concentration of these efforts on a smaller group of
losers. To obtain Stigler's result, one iust conjecture thatthis sort
of secondary effect is outweighed by the initial impulse to concentrate
gains to offset the effect of increased organization costs.
It is well to summarize the results of this formalization of Stigler's
model:
1. With a few ambiguities, the thrust ofimrfectinformation
abit both the gains and losses of regulatory decisions and costs of19
organizing for political favors is to restrict the size of the winning
group.
2. But this winning group will not obtainen a gross gain thraigh
political action as great as is within the power of the political process
to grant it.
3. Moreover, even if groups organize according to an economic in-
terest (producers v. consumers), political entrepreneurship will produce a
coalition which admits members of the losing group into the charmed circle.
I now apply these principles specifically to price-entry regulation,
and derive implications for the price-profits outccirie and the demand for
new regulation.
The Politics of Price-Entry Regulation
A generalization of the Stiglerian model of political transfers
just discussed would be to write the politician's objective function as:
(25) =
M(W1,w2)
where W. =wealthof group i, and where M > 0, but where we assume
no intergroup dependencies, so that M =0.This is then maximized
subject to a constraint on total wealth (V):
(26) V = + w2=
v(w1,w2)
where V. > 0, but where V < 0. That is, the total wealth to be dis-
tributed is limited: rarket failures aside, one group's wealth can be in-
creased only by decreasing the other's. Let us now suppose that the two
groups vying to achieve benefits or mitigate losses from the political20
process are consumers and producers, and that the process is constrained
to provide these gains and costs through the setting of a mimum or
minimum price together with control of entry. In this case, we can
specialize the majority generating function (25) as
(21) =i (p,it)
where
p =priceof the good
=wealthof producers, < 0 and > 0.
The implicit assumption here is that the powers of the state are sufficient
to, on the one hand, enforce competition, so that any ir > 0 translates into
political support, and on the other, to ban sale of the good or price it
out of existence, so that any consumer surplus provides some votes or
stills some opposition. A somewhat more elegant, though not necessarily
more insightful formulation would define (27) with respect to an anarchistic
reference point. I retain the Stiglerian assumption that the political
returns to higher or lower p are diminishing (M < 0, M <
7M < 0 is not, of course, strictly implied by diminishing returns,
pp
and we shall see later that so strict a condition is unnecessary.1±' we have
the simple function M =M(s),where S =consumer'ssurplus, rather than
p, and S =J'Q(p)dp, whereQ(p) is the demand curve, and Q(p') 0,
then diminishing political returns requires M55 < 0. However,this is re-
lated to M by
pp
M =M +S2M
pp S pp p SS
where
S =-Q <0 and S=-Q >0 .
Thus may be positive even if < 0, but < 0 is sufficient for
<0.21
I will also assume no intergroup political effects(such as envy or vin-
dictiveness), so =0.The relevant constraint here is given by cost
and demand conditions, summarized by the profit function
(28) =f(p,c)
where c =c(Q) =productioncosts as a function of quantity (Q),and
where over the range we shall be interested in, f > 0 and f< 0, p— pp
and, of course, < 0. The formal problem for a successful regulator
then is to maximize (I assume sufficient competition for the regulator1s
office) the Lagrangian
(29) L =M(p,ir) +rr-f(p,c))
with respect to p, 'iTand.,whichyields
(30) -=M=-
This says that the marginal political product of a dollar of profits
(Mr) must equal the marginal political product of a price cut (_M)
that also costs a dollar of profits (f is the dollar profit loss per
dollar price reduction). This result requires f > 0 (since
> 0); which is merely a concrete application of the result in (11).
That is poll tical equilibrium will not result in the monopoly or cartel-
profit maximizing price (f =0).The solution is shown graphically
in Figure 2, where (27) is represented as a series of iso-majority curves
(M.M.) obeying the assumed signs for first and second derivatives. Poli-
tical equilibrium occurs at tangency (A) between the profithilland an iso—22
majority curve. On this formulation, pure "producer protection" can be
rational only in the absence of any marginal consumer opposition to higher
prices (MM. are all horizontal) and pure "consumer protectiont' requires
no marginal support for higher profits.
This analysis says nothing about whether A in Figure 2 is anything
more than trivially different from either top or bottom of the profit-hill.
To make the analysis meaningful, we must either derive the appropriate
political power function (the shape of the M.M.) or focus on the effects
of changes in the underlying economic constraints. In the remainder of the
paper I take the latter tack.That is, I set aside the question of who
gets what share of the spoils to focus on the implications of the result
that the spoils will in fact be shared. For example, note one implication
of (30) for entry in regulation. Either natiraIly monopolistic or naturally
competitive industries are more politically attractive to regulate than
an oligopolistic hybrid. The inducement to regulate is the change in the
level of M.M occasioned thereby. For an oligopoly with a price already
intermediate between the competitive and monopoly price, the political
gain from moving to A will be smaller in general than if the pre-
regulation price is either at the top or bottom of the profit hill.
This may help explain such phenomena as the concurrence of regulation
of ostensible "natural monopolies" like railroads, utilities and telephones
with that of seemingly competitive industries like trucking, airlines,
taxicabs, barbers and agriculture. It may also rationalize the twin focus
of antitrust on reducing concentration and protecting small businessmen,
and the delay until comparatively recent times in applying the Sherman Act
to less than the most concentrated industries. However, the model does not
explain the dilatoriness of the government in regulating a gamut of







71 =. f(p, c)
P Price
021.
There is also implicit here a connection between regulation and
productivityand growth. Reduction in costs or growth in demand will
increase the total surplus (the height of the profit-hill in figure 2) over
which a regulator might have control, and, pan passu, the political payoff
for its redistribution.8 I have seen this point made before only in connec-
tion with welfare programs,9 and it deserves a systematic test. However,
the association of new regulation with industries where demand and/or produc-
tivity is growing rapidly is frequent enough to be suggestive (electricity
and telephones in the early 20th century, trucking and airlines in the 1930's
and 191i.O's, natural gas in the 1950's, automobiles and drugs in the 1960's).
Some interesting implications for the pattern of regulatory choice
can be derived from a more formal treatment of the interaction between
productivity and growth and rational political choice. Consider amarket I
alreadysubject to regulation and in a political equilibrium such as A
in Figure 2. Then consider the effects on this equilibrium of a parametric
shift, dx, in either the cost or demand function. To obtain theeffect
of the shift on the p.T[configuration generated by regulation, we must
is easiest to see for a constant cost competitive industry where
demand increases. In that case, the no-regulation majority is unaffected by
the increased demand (p and r are the same) but the gain to regulating the
industry and moving to a majority maximizing (p,i-r) is increased. I demonstrate
below that a similar result obtains for more complicated cases.
9See W. Allen Walls' discussion in James Tobin and W. Allen Wallis,
Welfare Programs: An Economic Appraisal at 514. (1968).25
solve
dp/dx
(31) [L] d'ir/dc=- [Lu]
dVdx
wherei, jdenotesp, r or .Inthe case of a (marginal) cost
shift, we obtain
(32)
—(M -)-f2M pp pppirr
The denominator is positive by a necessary condition for a maximum, s the
sign of (32) depends on that of the numerator, which is positive° This
is hardly surprising, since a rise in marginal cost leads to the same re-
suit without regulation. However, the insight provided by (32) is that
the price increase has distinct "political" and "economic" components.
The first term in the numerator (-7.f) is essentially a "substitution
effect" akinto that facing an unregulated firm. A rise in marginal cost
makes a higher price profitable. The second term is a "political wealth"
effect: the surplus to be disposed of has shrunk, and this forces the
regulator to reduce his purchases of political support. However, the
usual marginal conditions fai1iar from consumer theory are applicable
here. The regulator will, in general, not force the entire adjustment
'.<0, from (30);-c< 0; f > 0, since profits are
below a maximum; M < 0 by assumption; and
f =-Qc >0
px pQx26
onto one group. In particular, consumers will be called on to buffer
some of the producer losses. To see this more clearly, abstact from the
substitution effect by assuming a change in fi.xed cost only, so =0.
Then the profit hill in Figure 2 shifts down by a constant to
leaving the profit-maximizing price unchanged, but increasing the
political-equilibrium price and buffering the fall inprofitsthat would
otherwise occur.Of' course, as is the case in consumer choice, one
II
cannot rule out "inferiority" of price decreases or profit increases.
But the "normal" purely political component of the response to cost changes
involves consumers shielding producers from some of the effects of cost
increases and producers sharing some of their gains from cost reductions.
'1Such inferiority isin fact essentially ruled out here by the absence of
intergroup dependencies. This plays the same role here as utility indepen-
dence does in ruling out inferior goods in consumer choicetheory. The
closest analogy to the conventional consumer choice problem would bewhere
the regulator-always sets a marginal price equal to (a constant)marginal
cost and then merely allocates the resulting surplusamong producers and
consumers by fashioning a suitable two-part or declining-marginal price
scheme. In this case, the surplus is the regulator's "income" whichcanbe
usedto purchase the "goods" producer or consumer support at aprice of $1.
Ifthe utility (votes)of the two goods is independent, declining marg±nal
utilitywill assure that both are normal.
This analogue helps illuminate the attraction of regulation to
markets with growing productivity and demand. The increasedsurplus, which
is the regulator's income, generates a larger utility (vote)gain from moving
from either corner (monopoly or competition) to the vote maximum,againo
long as there are diminishing political returns to both producer and consumer
wealth.27
Thecase of a shift in demand is more complex, because the demand
function enters indirectly into the M function: M depends on the
relationship between price and consumer surplus, which depends on the
height of demand. Formally, a change in demand, dy, yields
—f +M +f fF.i /' — py pyyprir \33) dy
—
-(M -f )- f2
pp pp 71'Tr
Again,the first term of the tiumerator is a profit-maximizing "su.bstitu-
tion" effect which is positive2 and the last term a political wealth
effect which is, in this case negative (fy > 0). The middle term rep-
resents the effect of the demand shift on political "tastestt--i.e., on
the slope of the M.M. in Figure 2, but this effect is ambiguous.3 For
example, if a rise in consumer income raises the payoff to price reduc-
tions, < 0,and the political-wealth effect is reinforced. Ignoring.
this taste change, the results are symmetric with those of a cost change.
lLi
Considera rise in demand such that f=0.The political wealth effect
py





where Sagain denotes the underlyingconsumer surp]ns. So
Ii=-QM S -MQ
pySSy Sy
Since M5, Qand S > 0, while < 0, the sign of M is ambiguous.








Sosome Qpy < 0 is required for =0.28
will nevertheless induce a price reduction because the airninishing politi-
cal returns to both profit increases and price decreases make a combination
of the two the best strategy for political "spending" of more wealth.
What emerges from this discussion is more a working hypothesis than
an a priori conclusion about the nature of price and profit adjustment
under regulation. If the political wealth effect is empirically important, it
will be manifested in attenuation of price changes when demand changes, and
their amplification when costs change; vice versa for profit changes. in
the case of the latter, the wealth-effect components of the counterparts
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These are both smaller absolutely than what would obtain under pure pro-
ducer protection (which yields simply f or fy)• We can then sunmarize
the interaction between cost and demand changes and regulatory utility
maximization as follows: Define variables nt and pt as the difference
between regulated and profit maximizing profits and prices respectively.
The purely political effects of changes in underlying economic conditions
are then for dpt/dx and dTr'/dx> 0;dp'/dy and dir'/dy < 0. Among the
empirical implications of these forces would be:
1. Regulation will tend to be more heavily weighted toward "pro-
ducer protection" in depressions and toward ttconsumer protection" in29
) expansions.Thus, for example, it is not useful to view events like the
Robinson-Patman Act and the NRA as "inconsistent" with the intent of anti-
trust legislation; this intent is endogenous. Similar arguments apply to
the structure of taxes (the corporate-personal tax mix should offset changes
in the share of GNP earned by capital), tariffs (more free trade when de—
mand grows or costs fall), etc.
2. Government intervention and regulation are both normal goods.
Though this generalization has exceptions, the difference between the no-
regulation iso-majority curve and the regulatory equilibrium (i.e., the
incentive to regulate) grows with the level of demand. As a further
generalization, the income elasticity of producer protection ought to be
less than that of consumer protection. This follcs fran the negative
wealth effect of demand growth on equilibrium price, which makes for an
increased consumer share of the total surplus as demand (income) increases.
3.Thetendency ofregulationto change prices infrequently, some-
timescalled "regulatory lag" ought to be stronger when demand changes than
whencosts change. This follows from the opposing wealth and substitution
effects in the case of a shift in demand (but not in the case of a cost
change). Here failure to change a price can be interpreted to mean that
the opposing effects offset one another.
1. Some reexamination of studies, such as Stigler and Friedland's,
which show regulation to be ineffective is called for. In the first place
the result ought to be sensitive to the dynamics of supply and demand. In
a growing, technologically progressive industry, producer protection ought
to yield to consumer protection over time, even if, on average, there is
no effect. (stigler and Friedland's data do show some secular trend toward30
lower prices)5 Secondly, deviations about the zero mean effect should be
systematic: high cost, low demand markets will have prices elevated by
regulation and low cost high demand markets will have prices reduced.
Finally, as a generalization of (2), entry of regulation is not exogenous.
It should occur first in the low cost high demand markets. This last point
indicates some of the complexity engendered by the interaction of the static
and dynamic aspects of the model: whether entry of' regulation into any
market raises or lowers prices depends on whether the market was initially
competitive or monopolistic. Once that initial adjustment has been made,
subsequent cost and demand chnges will govern any redistribution from the
initial position.
5. If regulationisevaluatedagainsta zero-profit (fair rate of
return) benchmark, we might be tempted to conclude that positive profits
imply a "captured" regulator and thereby expect a positive correlation
between prices ar1 profitability. In fact the observed correlation ought
to be negative. Whatever its source-—increased demand or lower costs--an
increase in the profithill of Figure 2 generates a political incentive to
move toward a combination involving higher profits and lower prices.
Thus, quite apart from any private profit maximizing incentives toward
this configuration, the most profitable regulated firms ought to have
the lowest prices. More precisely, the gap between the profitmaximizing
and regulated price will be positively correlated with the gap between
the former and the "fair-rate—of-return" price.
15Stiglerand Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate?, p., 7. Their
estimate is that regulation had no effect on electricity rates in 1912,
and lowered prices by about 10 percent in 1937.31
6. The model also yields predictions on the bias of regulation.
Briefly, elastic demand and economies of scale create a bias favorable
to consumers. The reason is that these sorts of demand and cost condi-
tions enhance the consumer surplus gained while mitigating the producer
surplus lost due to a price reduction. To see this formally, first intro-
duce a parameter, w, into the slope of the demand curve at equilibrium,
so that a positive dw implies a less elastic demand. By appropriate
reformulation of the right—hand side of (31), we obtain the vector
L M -f M -f
pw pw pw pw
(36) L M Trw 7fi.J
L -f 0 w
where we set f =0(i.e., sume that the less elastic demand passes
through the initial price quantity combination). BothMpw and
are positive: A less elastic demand reduces the consumer surplus and vote
productivity of a price reduction, while it enhances the profitability
and vote productivity of a price increase.16
The signs of the relevant
total derivatives, then become
l6Again starting from =
-QMs,we get Mpw =M.ssS and
S > 0, so with M < 0, M > 0. Since
SS pw
f =(p-C)(Q +w)+ Q
p Qp
and with ..<0, -).f> 0.
pw(38) signd7T/dw =signfj •L
> 0
That is, a less elastic demand induces the regulator to "relocate"toward
the northeast on any iso-majority curve in Figure 2.
For the scale-economies case, introduce a parameter, v, into
marginal cost and assume that a negative dv leaves profits at the old
equUibrium unchanged. That is, if there is a lower maTginal cost in the
neighborhood of equilibrium, it is sufficiently higheratlower outputs
to leave total costs unchanged. This sort of characterization of in-
creased scale economies implies the vector
V
The diseconomies of smaller outputs when
less profitable (and so a price decrease
This renders the derivatives, dP/dv and
scale economies induce a move to the
The term, is positive.
dv < 0 make a price increase
more attractive politically).
d7r/dv, both positive, so more
southwest on any iso-majority curve.
Pending a systematic test of the empirical relevance of these
propositions, I point out potential pitfalls. The long history of "pro-
producer" regulation of agriculture (price supports, marketing restric-
tions, etc.) seems consistent with the model, given the conventional.
32







wisdom about low supply and demand elasticities in this sector. However,
the cartelization of airlirs, trucking, railroads, and taxicabs where
there are either constant or decreaLng costs is obviously troublesome.
A more general problem is how to distinguish the political incentives here
from corresponding profit-maximizing incentives which push in the same
direction, if we want to use the result to predict the behavior of estab-
lished regulators rather than the entry pattern in regulation)7
7. Finally, I note an implication for the theory of finance.
Regulation should reduce conventional measures of owner risk. By buf-
fering the firm against demand and cost changes, the variability of pro-
fits (and stock prices) should be lower than otherwise. To the extent
that the cost and demand changesare economy-wide, regulation should reduce
systematic as well as diversifiable risk.
There is no obvious risk pattern among currently regulated firms:
electric, gas and telephone utility stocks rank among the least risky while
airline stocks are among the most risky. However, in one case of new
regulation (of product quality), I found that both total and systematic
risk of drug stocks decreased substantially after regulation)8 A crude
test on railroad and utility stock prices shows the same pattern, though
17As an example of the kind of entry pattern that can be predicted,
consider a competitive industry with inelastic demand and supply. The
political equilibrium here is closer to the monopoly equilibrium than it
is with elastic demand and supply. Hence such an industry is more likely
to attract regulation thanone withela.stic demand and supply. Similarly
a natural monopoly with elastic demand and supply makes an inviting target
for regulation.
l8See S. Peltzman, The Benefits and Costs of New Drug Regulation, in
R. Landau,ed., Regulating New Drugs, 1973 at 205-206.3i.
the effect is weak. I correlated annual (December to December) changes in
the log of the Standard and Poor's or Cowles indexes of railroad and utility
stock price indices9with those of the industrial index (which I treat as a
diversified portfolio of stocks of unregulated firm.) for equal periods
spanning the onset of regulation. I took 1887 as the first year of rail-
road regulation, ard 1907 as the start of utility regulation. (New York
began regulatirg that year.) The indexes of systematic risk (estimated
as the regression coefficient on industrial stock price changes) were,






(1871-1906, 1907-)2) .67 .60
(.12) (.10)
The total risk of these stocks relative to industrials (the ratio of standard





All of the differences go in the right direction, but none are significant.
The main point of this exercise is simply to hint what further research
might be useful.
tandard and Poor's Corp., Security Price Index record (1971).35
TheStructure of Regulated Prices
I have argued that the rational regulator will not levy a uniform
tax nor distribute benefits equally. Rather, he will seek a structure of
costs and benefits that maximizes political returns. This search for
political advantage will in turn lead the regulator to suppress some
economic forces that might otherwise affect the price structure. For
example, the cost of serving a group of customers or their elasticity of
demand will have a differert impact under regulation than it will in an
unregulated market because of the absence of political constraints in the
latter case. The substitution of political or economic criteria in the
price Lormulation process has several interesting implications which I shall
elaborate. It is at the heart of the pervasive tendency of regulation to
engage in cross-subsidization--i.e., the dissipation of producr rents on sales
to some customers by setting below cost pricesto others. We shall see that
this cross—subsidization follows a systematic pattern in which high cost
customer groups are subsidized by low cost customers. Further, this pat-
tern of price discrimination emerges from a process in which conventional
profit maximizing price discrimination as well as other economic forces
leading to price differences are attenuated.
A convenient starting point for this analysis is the problem first
set out in equations (l)+)-(l6), where the regulator seeks a tax structure
to minimize opposition. Here I want to consider the effect on the resulting
tax structure when a change occurs of the type that would ordinarily lead
the gainers to seek a change in only one of the two tax rates. As an
example, suppose per capita wealth rises for one group only. In the
price regulation analogue to this problem, this would lead to a rise in
one group's demand, and a profit maximizing monopolist might then raise36
that group's price, but not the other group's price. Under regulation,
however, no such specializa±ion of a tax increase will be tolerated, be-
cause this would violate the basic principle that opposition from the two
groups must be equated at the margin.
This point can be demonstrated formally with the same framework
used previously. Specifically let there be a parameter shift, dx, in
the wealth of group 1 only. Then trace the effects of this shift on t1




=- [Lu,L2, L] L21L22L2
L1L2L
where the subscripts 1, 2 on the r.h.s. refer to t1 and t2. This has
the following relevant solutions
dt
(l) sign =sign[-LL -L L]
dt
(12) sign =sign[L L2 - . L11L2]
The sign of (li-i) is ambiguous, since the first term in brackets is positive
while the second is negative. The first term reflects the ability of the
regulator to both maintainrevenues and limit opposition by raising taxes
on the now wealthier group 1 individuals, while the second term is a
political wealth effect which induces lower tax rates. The more iht.eresting
result is that the sign of (L2) is unambiguously negative. This occurs37
firstbecause of the incentive to substitute higher taxes on group 1, which
creates the ambiguity in (1ii) and which in ()42) requires an offsetting decrease
in t2 to maintain equilibrium. This incentive to a lower t2 is rein-
forced by the political wealth effect. The analysis assumes no interde-
pendencies between the two groupst political responsiveness or wealth
(i.e., L12 is assumed to be zero). Thus what emerges here is that the
regulatorts striving for minimum opposition by equating opposition at the
margin leads him to spread effects of economic forces which are local to
all groups. This common element in the tax structure is provided by the
wealth effect which leads the regulator to buy more of both relevant trgoodstt
(less opposition from group 1 and from group 2).
This result can be applied to the regulation of prices by suitably
P
generalizingthe analysis of a single price summarized in Figure 2.That
is, assume that there are two separable groups of buyers,so that the
majoritygenerating functim (27) is
(1i3) M =M(p1,p2, 71)
with M1, < 0. The distinction between the two groups is economic
rather than political, in that I assume only that there are cost and/or
demand differences. Thus customers whom the regulator might wish to single
out for benefits can be scattered among both groups, and p1 and p2
can be regarded as averages from another price structure conditioned by
political forces. I suppress this structure here only to highlight the
difference between a regulated and unregulated market's response to common
economic forces. The cost/demand differences also give rise to the new
profit function38
(14k) = p2, c)
.
Withno loss of generality, I assume that it costs nothing to produce the
product for group 2, so c =costof production for group 1. Otherwise
the properties of (I41l) and its simpler counterpart (28) are the same
(f1, 2 ￿of, f22< o f < 0). Again, to make the problem non-
trivial, I rule out cross—group effects, so
M =MM =f =0 12 Li 2ir 12
We may now proceed to trace out the implications for the structure
of regulated prices if there is a change of the sort that would lead, in
an unregulated market, to a change solely of one group's price. As an
example, let group l's demand increase, so that, with independent demands and
costs, the profit maximizing or short-run competitive price would rise for that
group alone. The general problem now facing the regulator is to choose
the set (p1, p2, ii, )whichmaximizes the Igrangian
L =M(p1,p2 7T) + (ir -f(p1,p2, c))
(Note that we are dropping the restrictionin equations (l1i-)-(16) and (li-O)-
(11-2) of fixed "taxreceipts"--hereprofits--transferred to winners.) The
first-order conditions for a maximum here are similar to (30); specifically
M M
(11.6) ----=M=-
I Soboth p1 and p2 will be held below the pifit-rnaximizing level39
(,2> 0). Now let there be a parameter shift, dy, in group l's
demand, andletus see what effect this has on p1 and p2. Consequently,
we solve
i1 -l =
wherei, j =p1,p2, 71,).. Theleft hand side of p4-7) is a vector of
total derivatives; the first term on the right is a row-vector of partial
derivatives, and the second term is a matrix of partial derivatives. To
present the results in a manageable fashim, I define the following vari-
ables, and indicate their signs:
A =22
-M22) - f .M]> 0
(by second-order conditions for a maximum);
B =f1M .(M22
-f22)> 0
(by second order conditions and f1 > 0);
C =f2M(M11 > 0
(by second-order conditions and f2 > 0). I then show the results for







-±' B< 0 ("political wealth")
(1i9) sign =sign:
(tasteshift)
+).f •f2< 0 (substitution)
-fC < 0(political wealth).
Theiesultsin (li.8) aresimilar to those in (33), where weanalyzedthe
effects of a shift in demand on a single price. There is a change in
consumer surplus with ambiguous effects on the responsiveness of group 1
to price reductions (i.e., its "tastes" for price reductions). There is
a substitution effect, showing that it is "cheaper" for the regulator to
collect transfers in the form of higher prices to the higher demand group.
Finally there is a political wealth effect, showing that the regulator
will use the expanded opportunity locus to shield group 1 from the full
substitution effect.
The more interesting result is (149), since group 2 would be un-
affected in an unregulated market. Apart from the ambiguous "taste"
effect, there are two forces under regulation leading this group to
benefit from the higher demand of group 1. First, there is the converse11.1
ofthe substitution effect. If it is now more attractive to tax group 1,
then for any given tax receipt, the price to group 2 will be lower. Second,
there is the same wealth effect that assists group 1. The regulator dis-
tributes the gains me possible by the higher demand partly in, the form
of higher profits,20partly in the form of a lower price to group 1 and
partly in the form of a lower price to group 2. All the margins in (k6)
not just one or twc require adjustment when one group's demand increases
and thereby increases the wealth available to the regulator.
This result is illustrated in Figure 3, where I focus on the
structure of prices. Each of the curves labeled M is a locus of
price combinations consistent with a constant level of support or oppo-
sition from ccnsumers. These are negatively sloped, indicating that the
regulator can maintain the fixed support level by trading lower prices to
one 'oup for higher prices to another. The M index increases toward
the origin, since lower prices are preferred by both groups. For sirn-
plicity, I assume diminishing political returns to price reduction, so
the M are convex from above. The point A is the combination profit
maximizing prices, but the rational regulator wishes to set lower prices
than these. The frontier DGCshowsthe p1, p2 combinations which
yield the desired level of producer wealth. It is negatively sloped
since f1 and f2 are both positive (or zero at D and C respectively),
and concave from above, since both f11 and 22 are negative. The
20'Ihe result for the wealth component of d7r/dy is a more complex














equilibrium at G is defined by the first two conditions in (16). Con-
sider now the special case where the regulator desires to keep profits
fixed and the group 1 demand increases. If p1 at G exceeds marginal
cost, the profit frontier will shift outward over a range of prices in
the neighborhood of G. That is, with l's higher demand, the same profit
can be generated by a lower p1 holding p2 constant, or by a lower p2
holding p1 constant. (For simplicity, I have assumed that the p1 at
C also exceeds marginal cost, so that the frontier shifts out over the
entire relevant range.) It is this shift to EHG'F that produces a
"wealth effect" toward a lower p1, p2 set, though there will also be
a change in the slope of the frontier which will offset the incentive
toward a lower p1.
The implication here is that, not only will the average level of
prices under regulation be below what it would be in pure monopoly, but
the structure of relative prices will depart from that in either pure
monopoly or competition. The important contribution of politics is to
suppress economically important distinctions and substitute for these a
common element in all prices. On the demand side, this means that regu-
lators will taxprofitsby atenuating profitable price discrimination.
Discrimination is not eliminated, because there is a force--the substitution
effect--unifying the interests of a discriminating monopoly and the regu-
lator.21 It is countered by the wealth effect, so the empirical importance
2j . Inthe case ol a pure change in l's elasticity of demand--i.e.,
a change in the slope but not the height of demand--the relevant total
derivatives of P1 and P2 are opposite, because only a substitution
effect is at work.of this effect will determine that of the unique political effect on the
price structure. Equations ()-i-8) and (19) do shed this further light:
the term, f, is proportional to the difference between price and mar-
ginal cost. So, the political element in pricing should be most prominent
the more profitable the regulated firm.
Except that this last result does not hold, the case of a change in
costs is similar to that of a change in demand. Specifically, a rise in
the marginal cost of serving group 1 leads in addition to the conventional
substitution effect raising p1/p2, to a wealth effect raising both
p1
and p2.
This incentive to reward or tax all customers for the peculiar
characteristics of some has interesting implications for the structure of
regulated prices. Not only will profit-maximizing price discrimination
be discouraged, but a peculiar form of price discrimination will replace
it. This is usually referred to as "cross-subsidization" and, to the extent
that this is not just anothei name for ordinary price discrimination, it
connotes a structure in which an unprofitably low price for some is paid
for from profits on sales to others. This sort of phenomenon seems dif-
ficult to reconcile with the producer protection view of regulation. Why,
after all, would a surface transportation cartel wish to perpetuate un-
profitable passenger train or short haul rail freight service? So far
such questions have received no satisfactory answer, and the phenomenon
tends to be viewed as "a process of ad hoc pacification' of vocal con-
22 .. sumergroups. Our model suggests that the process is in fact systematic:
22George Hilton, The Basic Behavior of Regulatory Commissions, 62
Am. Econ. Rev. )9 (May, 1972).11.5
holding demand constant, the higher cost customers will receive the lower
price-margLnal cost ratios. Their peculiarly high costs will be spread
among all customer groups by a rational regulator. Thus we need not appeal
to adhoc judgments atout the political power of, say, train passengers or
short haul freight users to explain the pattern of cross-subsidization.
Instead, the model implies that we should oterve either a higher level
of costs (say for short hauls compared to long hauls) or more rapid in-
creases in costs (for passengers compared to freight) for the subsidized
group. More generally, the model sheds light on the tendency of regulation
to produce rate "averaging" across dissimilar customer groups--e.g.,
charging similar electricity rates to rural and urban customers (which
benefits the former) or similar auto insurance rates to rural and urban
customers (which benefits the latter). The common element in these price
structures is their suppression of cost differences.
I used this sort of model to rationalize differences in the price
structure under government ownership and regulation. This required an assump-
tion that purely political forces will be more prominent in the former
regime.23 It will take further empirical work to show whether the political
impulse to uniform treatment of customers also affects regulated rates sys-
tematically. I can illustrate some of the promise and pitfalls by appli-
cation to the airline rate structure. Keeler estimated price-marginal
cost ratios for standard coach service in 29 regulated city-pair maricets
as of l9oo.He found that the most prominent cost difference in airline
2'
3. Peltzman, Pricing in Public and Private Enterprises: Electric
Utilities in the United States, iii- J. Law and Econ. (1971).
2 E.Keeler, Airline Regulation and Market Performance 3Bell
J. of Econ. and £vgt. Science 2 (1972).service is distance related. Since major elements of cost are constant
per flight, the per mile marginal cost falls continuously with a flightts
distance. My model woud imply that effective CAB regulatin would convert
this cost structure into a price structure whereby price/marginal cost
rises continuosly with distance--i.e., the fare-distance taper would be
less severe than the cost-distance taper. One immediate pioblem is that
profit maxi.inizing discrimination would imply a similar price structure,
since ground alternatives are more competitive over shorter distances.
However, especially for standard coach service, where individualbusiness
travel tends to predominate over family and vacation travel (for which
airlines offer discounts), the viability of ground altermtives is res-
tricted. Gronau estimates that, for plausible values of time, airlines
will essentiallymonopolize the relevant market for distances over 600
miies.2 This implies that a profit-maximizing fare structure would have
price/marginal cost ratios rising substantially more sharply with distance
up to 600 miles than beyond. My model implies no such break, or at least
a continual increase in this ratio in the over 6oo mile sesents.
ToOrt these forces out, I regressed the log of Keeler's estirrte
of price/ marginal cost (P —MC)on two distance variables: the log of
distance if the city pair is less than 6oo miles apart and zero (i.e.,
one mile) otherwise (B1) and log of distance if the distance exceeds
6oo miles, zero otherwise (D2). From Gronau's results, profit maximization
implies that the coefficient of D1 is positive, while that of D2 is
zero. Poltical support maximization implies that both coefficients are
25R Gronau, The Effect of Traveling Time on the Demand for Passenger
Transportation, 78 J. Pol. Econ. 2 (1910).".7
positive,and, in the extreme, equal. The result is
P -Mc = -.66 + .l7]J+.17D2
(3.71) 4.I'.9)
=.69 S.E.X100=
(t-ratiosin parentheses). If the log of per-mile cost is regressed on
and D2, the corresponding coefficients are both -.26.This association of
a continuous increase in P -MCwith a continuous distance economy is strong
support for the political support maximization model against simple profit
maximization. The CAB essentially ignores the strength of ground competition
for a particular flight, and simply spreads the same part (about 2/3) of
flight's distance related economy among all fares.
Now the pitfall: Keeler has recently updated his cost estimates to
19714..26There has been no important change in airline technology: per-mile
costs still fall continuously with distance (the 19714. elasticity is -.22).
There has been, though, a major change in the fare structure. For the 19714.
data, the P -M,distance relationship is
P—MC=.Ii.l- .OlD -.OlD
(.23)1(.68)2
R2 =.33S.E.x 100 ='..l7.
The CAB has recently espoused the desirability of cost-based fares, and, more
importantly, it hes implemented them: the fare -andcost-distance gradients
26
See Civil Aeronautics Board Practices and Procedures, U.S. Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 9I4th Cong., 1st Sess., 58(1975).are now essentially identical. To get there, the CAB has permitted fares
on the longest flights in the sample to rise by under 30 per cent between
1968and1975, while those on the shortest have more than doubled. By l97I1,
much of the price-discrimination, at least on coach service, hadvanished.27
This implies that the CAB has been sacrificing producer and, incterxns of my
model, political wealth to the ghost of Pareto. I will not pretend that my
model offers any insight into this recent behavior, however well it seems to
explain matters up to1968.28 Perhaps, though, it does help exp1in recent
27Therange of the P -MCvariable was .7in1968 and .16 in 197k.
28e promise and pitfalls of the model are also illustrated by sur-
face freight rates. The cost structure here isLmilar to air-—a negative
cost/mi1e.i'ace taper. This is most pronounced for rails, and they have
experienced the most profound effects of the resulting political incentives:
short-haul rates sometimes below marginal cost, regulatory inhibitions on
elimination of such services and, recently, bankruptcies among short-haul
specialists. This all appears consistent with the basic model, except that
a simple extension should have firms and consumers treated similarly. That
is, the firms in this industry happen to be crudely separable by an economic
criterion--average length of freight haul. Maximization of political sport
from producers would then appear to require spreading some of the profit ef-
fects of high cost short.-haul service to the long-haul specialists. Indeed
the ICC has the power to do this by regulating divisions of joint rates.
However, it has obviously not been sufficiently diligent in its use of the
power to prevent striking differences in the prosperity of long- and bhort-
haul specialists; differences which appear superficially greater than those
that might be expected without regulation of iates and exit. This suggests
two problems: (l)why are the ICC's incentives to weld a coalition so much
stronger in the case of consumers than producers? (2) What accounts for
the difference between the ICC and CAB willingness to endanger the consumer
coalition by permitting economic efficiency criteria to intrude in the rate
structure?
There is finally a problem of appropriate units. A prime example of
cost-based cross subsidization is first-class postage. The rate here ignores
distance-related costs entirely, and so results in price/marginal cost
dec1inin with distance. The model can only hint at why weight happens to
be the relevant unit for the Postal Service and distance for the ICC and
CAB. One way by which a regulator can suppress cost differences is to ig-
nore them entirely. However, in deciding which kinds ofdif±'erences to ignore,
he must also take account of the implications for profits. Hence my con-
jecture would have to be that weight-related costs are more important than
distance—related costs in determining first—class postal service profits
and vice versa for transportation. A further implication would then be
that price/marginal cost infirstclass postal service would be negatively
related to marginal cost/pound, holding distance constant.11.9
Congressionaland ecutive initiatives to reduce the CAB's regulatory
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powers.
The intra-group equilibrium aspects of the model reveal some impli-
cations for entry——both of regulators and regulated firms. First there is
a clear incentive for regulators to limit entry (or seek the power to do
so) quite apart from considerations of the producer interest. This stems
directly from the fact that the politically appropriate price structure is
invariably discriminatory (in the economic sense) when costs differ among
customers. The proverbial "cream skimming" entrant must be prevented from
serving the low cost customers and thereby preventing the xgulator from
spreading the low costs to others. On the other hand, we can expect the
regulator to be more tolerant of entry which dampens the enthusiasm of
P
producersfor demand-based price discrimination. The regulator seeks to
suppressthe full effects of differences in the elasticity of demand, and
his way can be eased bypermittirigentry into low-elasticity market segments.
This last argument has more force in industries, like banking, where the
primaryregulatory control is over entry rather than price. In these cases,
the regulator uses the entry control to produce indirectly the desired price
structure. A testable implication would be that more entry is permitted in
banking, say, the larger the gap between interest rates on small and large
loans.
The obverse of the previous argument is that entry of regulation
is more attractive the more disparate the price structure. This is inde-
pendent of the pre-regulatory market stmcture. Competitively determined,
cost-based price differentials create an opportunity for political gain
2ee U.S. Senate,op. cit. andU.S.Department o± Transportation,
Aviation Act of 1975 (1975).50
through entry and/or price regulation designed to suppress the effects of
cost differences, just as discriminating monopoly invites political sup-
pression of the effects of demand elasticity differences.
In summary, the same forces that make regulators seek a broad-based
coalition operate on the price structure. Opportunities for increasing pro-
ducer wealth by price discrimination are not ignored, but they are never
fully exploted. To do this would narrow the cnsumer base of the coalition.
The uniquely political contribution to a price structure is to force a
more uniform treatment of consumers than the unregulated market by weakening
the link between prices and cost and demand conditions.
Concluding Remarks
This paper is concerned more with the design than the implementation
of a research strategy. Much of the recent ork in the theory of regulation
has focused on political poer relationships: which groupswillhave the
muscle to extract gains from there regulatory process. I have largely
begged this issue. In my general model, every identifiable group contains
winrers and losers, and even %there all the winners are in one group they
end up short-changed. This sort of result can hardly illuminate the nature
of the underlying power relationships, but that shortcoming is purposeful.
In the way I have chosen to model the regulatory process, these
powerrelationshipsplay a role analogous to tastes in consumer choice
theory. They shape the regulator's utility function. It has proved a
hily rewarding research strater for consumer choice theorists precisely
to beg questions of taste fonnation and concentrate instead on the be-
haviorale±'feCtsof changes in constraints in a regime of stable tastes.
With some qualification, there is an analogous history in production theory.51
I am suggesting here that the theory of politics has something to learn
from this experience. Even if we can do no more than derive the most
general properties of political power functions, there is much to learn
about political behavior in a world where the constraints do change. And
the specific contribution of economics to this venture will be enhanced if
the constraints are those already familiarto economists. I have tried to
show here how the most familiar sort of supply-demand apparatus can be
converted into a constraint onregulatory behavior. Once this is accom-
plished the equally familiar analytics of supply-demand changes yield
refutable implications about a wide range of regulatory behavior: when
regulation will occur, liw it will modify the unregulated price structure,
even how it will change the division of the gains over time (with no change
in relative political strengths).
Of coures, no student of George Stigler can view the derivation of
refttable implications as more than a first step. The usefulness of the
model developed here awaits tests of these implications, of which the
present paper is nearly devoid. The limited progress we have made in ex-
ploring political "tastes" is my main ground for optimism about the fruit-
fulness of a return to a mare familiar theoretical mode.3°
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Some specification of power relationships is unavoidable. It is
implicit, as Stigler has pointed out to me, in the choice of groups for which
the model's regulator acts as broker. For example, why not posit a political
redistribution between electricity producers and peanut vendors? Also, most
of the results of the model are driven by "normality" of the political-wealth
effect. Normality, in this context, is a specific assumption aboutpower (inter)
relationships.